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Abstract
Is the large influence that mutual funds assert on the U.S. financial
system spread across many funds, or is it is concentrated in only a few?
We argue that the dominant economic factor that determines this is
market efficiency, which dictates that fund performance is size inde-
pendent and fund growth is essentially random. The random process
is characterized by entry, exit and growth. We present a new time-
dependent solution for the standard equations used in the industrial
organization literature and show that relaxation to the steady-state
solution is extremely slow. Thus, even if these processes were station-
ary (which they are not), the steady-state solution, which is a very
heavy-tailed power law, is not relevant. The distribution is instead
well-approximated by a less heavy-tailed log-normal. We perform an
empirical analysis of the growth of mutual funds, propose a new, more
accurate size-dependent model, and show that it makes a good pre-
diction of the empirically observed size distribution. While mutual
funds are in many respects like other firms, market efficiency intro-
duces effects that make their growth process distinctly different. Our
work shows that a simple model based on market efficiency provides a
good explanation of the concentration of assets, suggesting that other
effects, such as transaction costs or the behavioral aspects of investor
choice, play a smaller role.
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1 Introduction
In the past decade the mutual fund industry has grown rapidly, moving
from 3% of taxable household financial assets in 1980, to 8% in 1990, to
23% in 20071. In absolute terms, in 2007 this corresponded to 4.4 trillion
USD and 24% of U.S. corporate equity holdings. Mutual funds account
for a significant fraction of trading volume in financial markets and have
a substantial influence on prices. This raises the question of who has this
influence: Are mutual fund investments concentrated in a few dominant
large funds, or spread across many funds of similar size? Do we need to
worry that a few funds might become so large that they are “too big to
fail”? What are the economic mechanisms that determine the concentration
of investment capital in mutual funds?
Large institutional investors are known to play an important role in the
market [Corsetti et al., 2001]. Gabaix et al. recently hypothesized that the
fund size distribution plays a central role in explaining the heavy tails in
the distribution of both trading volume and price returns2. If their theory
is true this would imply that the heavy tails in the distribution of mutual
fund size play an important role in determining market risk.
While it is standard in economics to describe distributional inequalities
in terms of statistics such as the Gini or Herfindahl indices, as we show in
Appendix A, this approach is inadequate to describe the concentration in
the tail. Instead, the best way to describe the concentration of assets is
in terms of the functional form of the tail. As is well-known in extreme
value theory [Embrechts et al., 1997], the key distinction is whether all the
moments of the distribution are finite. If the tail is truly concentrated, the
tail is a power law, and all the moments above a given threshold, called the
tail exponent, are infinite. So, for example, if the tail of the mutual fund
size distribution follows Zipf’s law as hypothesized by Gabaix et al., i.e. if
it were a power law with tail exponent one, this would imply nonexistence
of the mean. In this case the sample estimator fails to converge because
the tails are so heavy that with significant probability a single fund can be
larger than the rest of the sample combined. This is true even in the limit
as the sample size goes to infinity. Thus power law tails imply a very high
1 Data is taken from the Investment Company Institute’s 2007 fact book available at
www.ici.org.
2 The equity fund size distribution was argued to be responsible for the observed
distribution of trading volume [Levy et al., 1996; Solomon and Richmond, 2001], and
Gabaix et al. have argued that it is important for explaining the distribution of price
returns [Gabaix et al., 2003; Gabaix et al., 2006].
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degree of concentration.
Instead, empirical analysis shows that the tail of the mutual fund size
distribution is not a power law, and is well-approximated by a lognormal
[Schwarzkopf and Farmer, 2010]. Thus, while the distribution is heavy tailed,
it is not as heavy tailed as it would be if the distribution were a power law.
The key difference is that for a log-normal all of the moments exist.
This naturally leads to the question of what economic factors determine
the tail properties of the mutual fund distribution. There are two basic types
of explanation. One type of explanation is based on a detailed description
of investor choice, and another is based on efficient markets, which predicts
that growth should be random, and that the causes can be understood in
terms of a simple random process description of entry, exit and growth. Of
course market efficiency depends on investor choice, but the key distinction
is that the random process approach does not depend on any of the details,
but rather only requires that no one can make superior investments based
on simple criteria, such as size.
Explanations based on investor choice can in turn be divided into two
types: Rational and behavioral. For example, Berk and Green [2004] have
proposed that investors are rational, making investments based on past per-
formance. Their theory implies that the distribution of fund size is deter-
mined by the skill of mutual fund managers and the dependence of trans-
action costs on size. If we assume, for example, that the transaction cost is
a power law (which includes linearity) if the distribution of fund size is log-
normal, then it is possible to show that the distribution of mutual fund skill
must also be log-normal. Unfortunately, without a method of measuring
skill this is difficult to test.
Another type of explanation is behavioral, i.e. that investors are strongly
influenced by factors such as advertising, fees, and investment fads3. We
strongly suspect that this is true, and that they play an important role in
determining the size of individual funds. The question we investigate here
is not whether such effects exist, but whether they are essential to explain
the form of the distribution.
The alternative is that the details of investor choice don’t matter, and
that the distribution of fund size is driven by market efficiency, which dic-
tates an approach based on the random process of entry, exit and growth.
The random process approach was originally pioneered as an explanation
for firm size by Gibrat, Simon and Mandelbrot, and is popular in the indus-
3 Barber et al. [2005] have found that investors flows are correlated to marketing and
advertising while they are not correlated to the expense ratio.
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trial organization literature4. The basic idea is that while details of investor
choice are surely important in determining the size of individual funds, the
details may average out or be treatable as noise, so that in aggregate they
do not matter in shaping the overall size distribution.
On the face of it, however, there seems to be a serious problem with
this approach. Under simple assumptions about the entry, exit and growth
of fund size, Gabaix et al. [2003] showed that the steady state solution is
a power law; a similar argument is described in Montroll and Shlesinger
[1982] and Reed [2001]5. As already mentioned, however, the upper tail
of the empirical distribution is a log-normal, not a power law. Thus there
would seem to be a contradiction. Apparently either the correct random
process is more complicated, or this whole line of attack fails.
We show here that the central problem comes from considering only
the steady state (i.e. infinite time) solution. We study the same equations
considered by Gabaix et al. and Reed, but we find a more general time-
dependent solution, and show that the time required to reach steady state
is very long. The mutual fund industry is rapidly growing and, even if the
growth process had been stationary over the last few decades, not enough
time has elapsed to reach the stationary solution for the fund size distribu-
tion. In the meantime the solution is well approximated by a log-normal.
This qualitative conclusion is very robust under variations of the assump-
tions. In contrast to the hypothesis of Berk and Green, it does not depend
on details such as the distribution of investor skill – the log-normal property
emerges automatically from market efficiency and the random multiplicative
nature of fund growth.
To test our conjectures more quantitatively we study the empirical prop-
erties of entry, exit and growth of mutual funds, propose a more accurate
model than those previously studied, and show it makes a good prediction
of the empirically observed fund size distribution. The model differs from
previous models in that it incorporates the fact that the relative growth
rate of funds slows down as they get bigger6. This makes the time needed
to approach the steady state solution even longer: Whereas the relaxation
time for the size-independent diffusion model is several decades, for the more
4 For past stochastic models see [Gibrat, 1931; Simon, 1955; Simon, H. A. and Bonini,
Charles P., 1958; Mandelbrot, 1963; Ijiri and Simon, 1977; Sutton, 1997; Gabaix et al.,
2003; Gabaix et al., 2003].
5 For a review on similar generative models see Mitzenmacher [2003].
6 For work on the size dependence of firm growth rate fluctuations see[Stanley et al.,
1995, 1996; Amaral et al., 1997; Bottazzi, 2001; Bottazzi and Secchi, 2003a, 2005; Dosi,
2005; De Fabritiis et al., 2003].
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accurate size-dependent model it is more than a century.
Market efficiency is the key economic principle that makes the random
process model work, and dictates many of its properties. It enters the story
in several ways. (1) The fact that stock market returns are essentially ran-
dom implies that growth fluctuations are random, for two reasons: (a) With-
out inflows and outflows, under the principle that past returns are not in-
dicative of future returns, fund growth is random. (b) Although investors
chase past returns, since what they are chasing is random, fund growth due
to inflow and outflow is random on sufficiently long time scales. (2) Effi-
ciency dictates that mutual fund performance must be independent of size.
Thus as mutual funds randomly diffuse through the size space, there is no
pressure pushing them toward a particular size. (3) Efficiency, together with
the empirical fact that the relative importance of fund inflows and outflows
diminishes as funds get bigger, implies that the mean growth rate and the
growth diffusion approach a constant in the large size limit. As we show,
this shapes the long-term properties of the size distribution. All of these
points are explained in more detail in Section 4.3.
Market efficiency makes mutual funds unusual relative to most other
types of firms. For most firms, in the large size limit the mean and standard
deviation of the growth rate are empirically observed to decay to zero. For
mutual funds, in contrast, due to market efficiency they both approach a
positive limit. This potentially affects the long-term behavior: Most firms
approach a solution that is thinner than a log-normal, i.e under stationary
growth conditions their tails are getting thinner with time, whereas mutual
funds approach a power law, so their tails are getting fatter with time.
Nonetheless, as we have already mentioned, even under stationary growth
conditions the approach to steady-state takes so long that this is a moot
point.
At a broader level our work here shows how the non-stationarity of
market conditions can prevent convergence to an “equilibrium” solution.
Nonetheless, even under stationary conditions the random process model
usefully describes the time-dependent relationships between entry, exit and
growth phenomena on one hand and size on the other hand. While we can-
not show that the random process model is the only possible explanation,
we do show that it provides a good explanation7. The conditions for this
are robust, depending only on market efficiency, without the stronger re-
7 While variations in the assumptions about the random process preserve certain quali-
tative conclusions, such as the log-normal character of the upper tail, we found that getting
a good fit to the data requires a reasonable degree of fidelity in the modeling process. The
size-dependent nature of the diffusion process, for example, is quite important.
5
quirements of perfect rationality, or the complications of mapping out the
idiosyncrasies of human behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop the standard
exit and entry model. Section 2.1 presents the time-dependent solution for
the number of funds, Section 2.2 presents the time-dependent solution for
the size distribution, and Section 2.3 introduces a size-dependent model.
Section 3 describes our data. In Section 4 we perform an empirical analysis
to justify our assumptions and to calibrate the model. In Section 5 we
present simulation results of the proposed model and compare them to the
empirical data. Finally Section 6 presents our conclusions.
2 Model
Our central thesis in this paper is that due to market efficiency the mutual
fund size distribution can be explained by a stochastic process governed by
three key underlying processes: the size change of existing mutual funds, the
entry of new funds and the exit of existing funds. In this section we introduce
the standard diffusion model and derive a time-dependent solution for the
special case when the diffusion process has constant mean and variance. We
then make a proposal for how to model the more general case where the
mean and variance depend on size.
The aim of the model we develop here is to describe the time evolution
of the size distribution, that is, to solve for the probability density function
p(ω, t) of funds with size s at time t, where ω = log s. The size distribution
can be written as
p(ω, t) =
n(ω, t)
N(t)
, (1)
where n(ω, t) is the number of funds at time with logarithmic size ω and
N(t) =
∫
n(ω, t)dω is the total number of funds at time t. To simplify the
analysis we solve separately for the total number of funds N(t) and for the
number density n(ω, t).
2.1 Dynamics of the total number of funds
As we will argue in Section 4, the total number of funds as a function of
time can be modeled as
dN
dt
= ν − λN (2)
6
where ν is the rate of creating new funds and λ is the exit rate of existing
funds. Under the assumption that ν and λ are constants this has the solution
N(t) =
ν
λ
(
1− e−λt
)
θ(t), (3)
where θ(t) is a unit step function at t = 0, the year in which the first funds
enter. This solution has the surprising property that the dynamics only
depend on the fund exit rate λ, with a characteristic timescale 1/λ. For
example, for λ ≈ 0.09, as estimated in Section 4, the timescale for N(t) to
reach its steady state is only roughly a decade. An examination of Table I
makes it clear, however, that ν = constant is not a very good approximation.
Nonetheless, if we crudely use the mean creation rate ν ≈ 900 from Table I
and the fund exit rate λ ≈ 0.09 estimated in Section 4, the steady state
number of funds should be about N ≈ 10, 000, compared to the 8, 845 funds
that actually existed in 2005. Thus this gives an estimate with the right
order of magnitude.
The important point to stress is that the dynamics for N(t) operate on a
different timescale than that of n(ω, t). As we will show in the next section
the characteristic timescale for n(ω, t) is much longer than that for N(t).
2.2 Solution for the number density n(ω, t)
We define and solve the time evolution equation for the number density
n(ω, t). The empirical justification for the hypotheses of the model will be
given in Section 4. The hypotheses are:
• The entry process is a Poisson process with rate ν, such that at time
t a new fund enters the industry with a probability νdt and (log) size
ω drawn from a distribution f(ω, t). We approximate the entry size
distribution as a log-normal distribution in the fund size s, that is a
normal distribution in ω given by
f(ω, t) =
1√
piσ2ω
exp
(
−(ω − ω0)
2
σ2ω
)
θ(t− t0), (4)
where ω0 is the mean log size of new funds and σ
2
ω is its variance.
θ(t − t0) is a unit step function ensuring no funds funds enter the
industry before the initial time t0.
• The exit process is a Poisson process such that at any time time t a
fund exits the industry with a size independent probability λdt.
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• The size change is approximated as a (log) Brownian motion with a
size dependent drift and diffusion term
dω = µ(ω)dt+ σ(ω)dW, (5)
where dW is an i.i.d random variable drawn from a zero mean and
unit variance normal distribution.
Under these assumptions the forward Kolmogorov equation (also known
as the Fokker-Plank equation) defining the time evolution of the number
density [Gardiner, 2004] is given by
∂
∂t
n(ω, t) = νf(ω, t)− λn(ω, t)− ∂
∂ω
[µ(ω)n(ω, t)] +
∂2
∂ω2
[D(ω)n(ω, t)], (6)
where D(ω) = σ(ω)2/2 is the size diffusion coefficient. The first term on the
right describes the entry process, the second describes the fund exit process
and the third and fourth terms describe the change in size of a existing
funds.
2.2.1 Approximate solution for large funds
To finish the model it is necessary to specify the functions µ(ω) and D(ω).
It is convenient to define the relative change in a fund’s size ∆s(t) as
∆s(t) =
s(t+ 1)− s(t)
s(t)
, (7)
such that drift and diffusion parameters in our model are given by
µ(ω) = E[log(1 + ∆s)] D(ω) =
1
2
Var[log(1 + ∆s)].
The relative change can be decomposed into two parts: the return ∆r and
the fractional investor money flux ∆f (t), which are simply related as
∆s(t) = ∆f (t) + ∆r(t). (8)
The return ∆r represents the return of the fund to its investors, defined as
∆r(t) =
NAV (t+ 1)−NAV (t)
NAV (t)
, (9)
8
where NAV (t) is the Net Asset Value at time t. The fractional money flux
∆f (t) is the change in the fund size by investor deposits or withdrawals,
defined as
∆f (t) =
s(t+ 1)− [1 + ∆r(t)]s(t)
s(t)
. (10)
In Section 4 we will demonstrate empirically that the returns ∆r are
independent of size, as they must be for market efficiency. In contrast the
money flux ∆f decreases monotonically with size. In the large size limit the
returns ∆r dominate, and thus it is reasonable to treat µ(s) as a constant,
µ = µ∞. Market efficiency also implies that in the large size limit the
standard deviation σ(s) is a constant, i.e. σ = σ∞. Otherwise investors
would be able to improve their risk adjusted returns by simply investing in
larger funds.
With these approximations the evolution equation becomes
∂
∂t
n(ω, t) = νf(ω, t)− λn(ω, t)− µ ∂
∂ω
n(ω, t) +D
∂2
∂ω2
n(ω, t), (11)
In this and subsequent equations, to keep things simple we use the notation
D = σ2∞/2 and µ = µ∞.
The exit process is particularly important, since it is responsible for
thickening the upper tail of the distribution. The intuition is as follows:
Since each fund exits the industry with the same probability, and since there
are more small funds than large funds, more small funds exit the industry.
This results in relatively more large funds, making the distribution heavy-
tailed. As we will now show this results in the distribution evolving from
a log-normal upper tail to a power law upper tail. In contrast, the entry
process is not important for determining the shape of the distribution, and
influences only the total number of funds N . This is true as long as the
entry size distribution f(ω, t) is not heavier-tailed than a lognormal, which
is supported by the empirical data.
In the large size limit the solution for an arbitrary entry size distribution
f is given by
n(ω, t) = ν
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ t
0
exp−λt
′ 1√
4piDt′
exp
[
−(ω − ω
′ − µt′)2
4Dt′
]
f(ω′, t−t′) dt′dω′.
(12)
Stated in words, a fund of size ω′ enters at time t − τ with probability
f(ω′, t − τ). The fund will survive to time t with a probability exp(−λτ)
and will have a size ω at time t with a probability according to (23).
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If funds enter the industry with a constant rate ν beginning at t = 0,
with a log-normal entry size distribution f(ω, t) centered around ω0 with
width σω as given by (4), the size density can be shown to be
n(ω, t) =
νµ
4
√
γD
exp
[
(γ +
1
4
)
σ2ω
2
−√γ
∣∣∣∣∣σ2ω2 + µD (ω − ω0)
∣∣∣∣∣+ µ2D (ω − ω0)
]
×
(
A+ exp
[√
γ|σ2ω + 2
µ
D
(ω − ω0) |
]
B
)
. (13)
The parameters A, B and γ are defined as
γ =
√
1
4
+
λD
µ2
, (14)
A = Erf

∣∣∣σ2ω2 + µD (ω − ω0)∣∣∣−√γσ2ω√
2σω
 (15)
−Erf

∣∣∣σ2ω2 + µD (ω − ω0)∣∣∣−√γ (σ2ω + 2µ2D t)
√
2
√
σ2ω + 2
µ2
D t

and
B = Erf
√γ
(
σ2ω
2 +
µ2
D t
)
+ |σ2ω2 + µD (ω − ω0) |
√
2
√
σ2ω + 2
µ2
D t
 (16)
−Erf
√γσ2ω +
∣∣∣σ2ω2 + µD (ω − ω0)∣∣∣√
2σω
 ,
where Erf is the error function, i.e. the integral of the normal distribution.
Approximating the distribution of entering funds as having zero width
simplifies the solution. Let us define a large fund as one with ω  ω0, where
ω0 is the logarithm of the typical entry size of one million USD. For large
funds we can approximate the lognormal distribution as having zero width,
i.e. all new funds have the same size ω0. The number density is then given
by
n(ω, t) =
νD
4
√
γµ2
e
1
2
µ
D
(ω−ω0)
[
e−
√
γ µ
D
|ω−ω0|
1 + erf
√γµ2t
D
− |ω − ω0|
2
√
Dt

−e
√
γ µ
D
|ω−ω0|
(
1− erf
[
µ
√
t
D
(
1
2
+
√
γ)
])]
. (17)
Since γ > 1/4 (14), the density vanishes for both ω →∞ and ω → −∞.
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2.2.2 Steady state solution for large funds
The steady state solution for large times is achieved by taking the t → ∞
limit of (17), which gives
n(ω) =
ν
2µ
√
γ
exp
µ
D
(
ω − ω0
2
−√γ|ω − ω0|
)
. (18)
Since the log size density (18) has an exponential upper tail p(ω) ∼ exp(−ζsω)
and s = exp(ω) the CDF for s has a power law tail with an exponent8 ζs,
i.e.
P (s > X) ∼ X−ζs . (19)
Substituting for the parameter γ using Eq. (14) for the upper tail exponent
yields
ζs =
−µ+√µ2 + 4Dλ
2D
. (20)
Note that this does not depend on the creation rate ν. Using the average
parameter values in Table III the asymptotic exponent has the value
ζs = 1.2± 0.6. (21)
This suggests that if the distribution reaches steady state it will follow Zipf’s
law, which is just the statement that it will be a power law with ζs ≈ 1.
As discussed in the introduction, this creates a puzzle, as the empirical
distribution is clearly log-normal [Schwarzkopf and Farmer, 2010].
2.2.3 Timescale to reach steady state
Since we have a time dependent solution we can easily estimate of the
timescale to reach steady state. The time dependence in Eq. 17 is con-
tained in the arguments of the error function terms on the right. When
these arguments become large, say larger than 3, the solution is roughly
time independent, and can be written as
t >
9D
4γµ2
1 +
√
1 +
2
9
√
γµ2
D
|ω − ω0|
2 . (22)
8 To calculate the tail exponent of the density correctly one must change variables
through p(s) = p(ω)dω
ds
∼ s−ζs−1. This results in a CDF with a tail exponent of ζs.
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Using the average values in Table III in units of months µ = µ∞ ≈ 0.005,
D = σ2∞/2 and σ∞ ≈ 0.05. This gives
t > 180
(
1 +
√
1 + 0.7 |ω − ω0|
)2
,
where the time is in months. Plugging in some numbers from Table III
makes it clear that the time scale to reach steady state is very long. For
instance, for funds of a billion dollars it will take about 170 years for their
distribution to come within 1 percent of its steady state. This agrees with
the empirical observation that there seems to be no significant fattening of
the tail in the fifteen years from 1991 - 2005. Note that the time required for
the distribution n(ω, t) to reach steady state for large values of ω is much
greater than that for the total number of funds N(t) to become constant.
During the transient phase the solution remains approximately log-normal
for a long time. If funds only change in size and no funds enter or exit, then
the resulting distribution is normal
n˜(w, t) =
1√
4piDt
exp
[
−(ω − µt)
2
4Dt
]
, (23)
which corresponds to a size distribution p(s) with a lognormal upper tail.
While the exit process acts quickly in changing the total number of funds, it
acts slowly in changing the shape. This is the key reason why the distribution
remains approximately log-normal for so long.
2.3 A better model of size dependence
The mean rate of growth and diffusion are in general size dependent. We
hypothesize that the mean growth rate µ(s) and the standard deviation σ(s)
are the sum of a power law and a constant, of the form
σs(s) = σ0s
−β + σ∞ (24)
µs(s) = µ0s
−α + µ∞.
The constant terms come from mutual fund returns (neglecting inflow or
outflow of funds), and must be constant due to market efficiency, as ex-
plained in more detail in Section 4.3. The power law terms, in contrast,
are due to the flow of funds in and out of the market. There is a sub-
stantial literature of proposed theories for this, including ours9. We present
9 There has been a significant body of work attempting to explain the heavy tails in
the growth rate of firms and the associated size dependence in the diffusion rate. See
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the empirical evidence for the power law hypothesis and explain the role of
efficiency in more detail in Section 4.3.2.
The functional form given above for the size dependence can be used to
make a more accurate diffusion model. The non vanishing drift µ∞ > 0 and
diffusion terms σ∞ > 0 are essential for the distribution to evolve towards a
power law. As already mentioned, due to market efficiency E[∆r(s)] must
be independent of s, and since E[∆f (s)] is a decreasing function of s, for
large s µ(s) = E[∆r(s)] + E[∆f (s)] = µ∞ > 0. This distinguishes mutual
funds from other types of firms, which are typically observed empirically to
have µ∞ = σ∞ = 0 [Stanley et al., 1996; Matia et al., 2004]. Assuming
that other types of firms obey similar diffusion equations to those used here,
it can be shown that the resulting distribution has a stretched exponential
upper tail, which is much thinner than a power law10.
3 Data Set
We test our model against the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund
Database. Because we have daily data for each mutual fund, this database
enables us to investigate the mechanism of fund entry, exit and growth to
calibrate and test our model11. We study the data from 1991 to 200512. We
define an equity fund as one whose portfolio consists of at least 80% stocks.
The results are not qualitatively sensitive to this, e.g. we get essentially the
same results even if we use all funds. The data set has monthly values for
the Total Assets Managed (TASM) by the fund and the Net Asset Value
[Amaral et al., 1997; Buldyrev et al., 1997; Amaral et al., 1998; De Fabritiis et al., 2003;
Matia et al., 2004; Bottazzi, 2001; Sutton, 2001; Wyart and Bouchaud, 2003; Bottazzi
and Secchi, 2003b, 2005; Fu et al., 2005; Riccaboni et al., 2008; Podobnik et al., 2008].
Our theory argues for an additive replication model, and produces predictions that fit
the data extremely well for a diverse set of different phenomena, including mutual funds
[Schwarzkopf et al., 2010]. We argue that the fundamental reason for the power tails is
the influence network of investors.
10 A stretched exponential is of the form p(x) ∼ exp(ax−b), where a and b are positive
constants. There is some evidence in the empirical data that the death rate λ also decays
with size. However, in our simulations we found that this makes very little difference for
the size distribution as long as it decays slower than the distribution of entering funds,
and so in the interest of keeping the model parsimonious we have not included this effect.
11 Note that we treat mergers as the dissolution of both original firms followed by the
creation of a new (generally larger) firm. This increases the size of entering firms but does
not make a significant difference in our conclusions.
12 There is data on mutual funds starting in 1961, but prior to 1991 there are very few
entries. There is a sharp increase in 1991, suggesting incomplete data collection prior to
1991.
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(NAV). We define the size s of a fund to be the value of the TASM, measured
in millions of US dollars and corrected for inflation relative to July 2007.
Inflation adjustments are based on the Consumer Price Index, published by
the BLS. In Table I we provide summary statistics of the data set and as
seen there the total number of equity funds increases roughly linearly in
time, and the number of funds in the upper tail Ntail also increases.
4 Empirical investigation of size dynamics
In this section we empirically investigate the processes of entry, exit and
growth, providing empirical justification and calibration of the model de-
scribed in Section 2.
4.1 Fund entry
We begin by examining the entry of new funds. We investigate both the
number Nenter(t) and size s of funds entering each year. We perform a
linear regression of Nenter(t) against the number of existing funds N(t− 1),
yielding slope α = 0.04± 0.05 and intercept β = 750± 300. The slope is not
statistically significant, justifying the approximation of entry as a Poisson
process with a constant rate ν, independent of N(t).
The size of entering funds is more complicated. In Figure 1 we compare
the distribution of the size of entering funds f(s) to that of all existing
funds. The distribution is somewhat irregular, with peaks at round figures
such as ten thousand, a hundred thousand, and a million dollars. The
average size13 of entering funds is almost three orders of magnitude smaller
than that of existing funds, making it clear that the typical surviving fund
grows significantly after it enters. It is clear that the distribution of entering
funds is not important in determining the upper tails14. The value of the
mean log size and its variance are calculated from the data for each period
as summarized in Table III.
13 When discussing the average size one must account for the difference between the
average log size and the average size: Due to the heavy tails the difference is striking. The
average entry log size E[ωc] ≈ 0, corresponding to a fund of size one million, while if we
average over the entry sizes E[sc] = E[e
ωc ], we get an average entry size of approximately
30 million. For comparison, both the average size and the average log size of existing
funds are quoted in Table I.
14 In Section 2.2 we showed that the entry process is not important as long as the tails of
the entry distribution f are sufficiently thin. We compared the empirical f to a log-normal
and found that the tails are substantially thinner.
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Figure 1: The probability density for the size s of entering funds in millions
of dollars (solid line) compared to that of all funds (dashed line) including
all data for the years 1991 to 2005. The densities were estimated using a
gaussian kernel smoothing technique.
Thus the empirical data justifies the approximation of entry as a Poisson
process in which an average of ν funds enter per month, with the size of each
fund drawn from a distribution f(ω, t).
4.2 Fund exit
Unlike entry, fund exit is of critical importance in determining the long-run
properties of the fund size distribution. In Figure 2 we plot the number of
exiting funds Nexit(t) as a function of the total number of funds existing in
the previous year, N(t − 1). There is a good fit to a line of slope λ, which
on an annual time scale is λ = 0.092± 0.030. This justifies our assumption
that fund exit is a Poisson process with constant rate λ.
4.3 Fund growth
We first test the i.i.d and normality assumptions of the diffusion growth
model, and then test to demonstrate the size dependence of the growth
process that we proposed in Section 2.3. We also discuss the diverse roles
that efficiency plays in shaping the random process for firm growth in more
detail.
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Figure 2: The number of equity funds exiting the industry Nexit(t) in the
year t as a function of the total number of funds existing in the previous
year, N(t− 1). The plot is compared to a linear regression (full line). The
error bars are calculated for each bin under a Poisson process assumption,
and correspond to the square root of the average number of funds exiting
the industry in that year.
4.3.1 Justification for the diffusion model
In the absence of entry or exit we have approximated the growth of existing
funds as a multiplicative Gibrat-like process15 satisfying a random walk in
the log size ω. This implicitly assumes that ∆s is an i.i.d normal random
variable.
The assumption of independence is justified by market efficiency, which
requires that the returns ∆r of a given fund should be random [Bollen and
Busse, 2005; Carhart, 1997]. Under the decomposition of the total growth
as ∆s = ∆r + ∆f , as demonstrated in the next sub-section, in the large
size limit the returns ∆r dominate, so under market efficiency the i.i.d.
assumption is automatically valid.
This is not so obvious for smaller size firms, where the money flux ∆f
dominates the total growth ∆s. It is well known that investors chase past
15 A Gibrat-like process is a multiplicative process in which the size of the fund at any
given time is given as a multiplicative factor times the size of the fund at a previous time.
In Gibrat’s law of proportionate effect [Gibrat, 1931] the multiplicative term depends
linearly on size while here we allow it to have any size dependence.
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performance16. Even though the past performance they are chasing is ran-
dom, if they track a sufficiently long history of past returns, this can induce
correlations. This causes correlations in the money flux ∆f , which in turn
induces correlations in the total size change ∆s.
To test whether such correlations are strong enough to cause problems
with the random process hypothesis, we perform cross-sectional regressions
of the form
∆f (t) = β + β1∆r(t− 1) + β2∆r(t− 2) + . . .+ β6∆r(t− 6) + ξ(t), (25)
where ξ(t) is a noise term. The results are extremely noisy; for example,
when we perform separate regressions in five different periods, eight of the
thirty possible coefficients βi shown in Table II are negative and only two of
them are significant at the two standard deviation level. We also perform
direct tests of the correlations in ∆f and we find that they are small. This
justifies our use of the i.i.d. hypothesis.
The normality assumption is also not strictly true. Here we are saved
by the fact that the money flux ∆f is defined in terms of a logarithm, and
while it has heavy tails, they are not sufficiently heavy to prevent it from
converging to a normal. We have explicitly verified this by tracking a group
of funds in a given size range over time and demonstrating that normality
is reached within 5 months. Thus even though the normality assumption is
not true on short timescales it rapidly becomes valid on longer timescales.
4.3.2 Size dependence of the growth process
We now test the model for the size dependence of the growth process pro-
posed in Section 2.3. We also discuss the crucial role of the decomposition
into returns and money flux in determining the size dependence.
Figure 3 gives an overview of the size dependence for both the returns ∆r
and the money flux ∆f . The two behave very differently. The returns ∆r are
essentially independent of size17. This is expected based on market efficiency,
16 For empirical evidence that investors react to past performance see [Remolona et al.,
1997; Busse, 2001; Chevalier, Judith and Ellison, Glenn, 1997; Sirri, Erik R. and Tufano,
Peter, 1998; Guercio, Diane Del and Tkac, Paula A., 2002; Bollen, 2007].
17 The independence of the return ∆r on size is verified by performing a linear regression
of µr vs. s for the year 2005, which results in an intercept β = 6.7 ± 0.2 × 10−3 and a
slope α = 0.5± 8.5× 10−8. This result implies a size independent average monthly return
of 0.67%.
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Figure 3: A summary of the size dependence of mutual fund growth. The
average mean µr and volatility σr of fund returns, as well as the average
µf and volatility σf of money flux (i.e. the flow of money in and out of
funds), are plotted as a function of the fund size (in millions) for the year
2005 (see Eqs. (7 - 10)). The data are binned based on size, using bins with
exponentially increasing size; we use monthly units. The average monthly
return µr is compared to a constant return of 0.008 and the monthly volatil-
ity σr is compared to 0.03. The average monthly flux µf is compared to a
line of slope of -0.5 and the money flux volatility σf is compared to a line of
slope -0.35. Thus absent any flow of money in or out of funds, performance
is independent of size, as dictated by market efficiency. In contrast, both
the mean and the standard deviation of the money flows of funds decrease
roughly as a power law as a function of size.
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date 12/2005 9/2005 6/2005 3/2005 12/2004
β1 0.10± 0.16 0.40± 0.98 0.27± 0.68 1.17± 4.68 −0.23± 1.24
β2 0.14± 0.27 0.36± 1.20 0.48± 0.83 −0.79± 3.13 −0.65± 2.31
β3 0.28± 0.45 0.01± 1.07 0.33± 0.83 1.79± 3.24 0.60± 2.57
β4 0.56± 0.40 −0.28± 0.85 0.24± 1.27 −0.28± 1.65 0.44± 2.32
β5 0.24± 0.43 −0.25± 1.13 0.21± 0.90 −0.24± 2.95 0.43± 2.49
β6 0.48± 0.38 −0.02± 1.03 0.30± 0.92 1.27± 3.50 0.31± 2.09
β −0.02± 0.02 0.03± 0.05 0.01± 0.05 0.14± 0.21 0.06± 0.15
Table II: Cross-sectional regression coefficients of the monthly fund flow,
computed for several months, against the performance in past months, as
indicated in Eq. 25. The regression was computed cross-sectionally using
data for 6189 equity funds. For example the entry for β1 in the first (from
the left) column represents the linear regression coefficient of the money
flux at the end of 2005 on the previous month’s return. The errors are 95%
confidence intervals.
as otherwise one could obtain superior performance simply by investing in
larger or smaller funds [Malkiel, 1995]. This implies that equity mutual funds
can be viewed as a constant return to scale industry [Gabaix et al., 2006].
Both the mean µr = E[∆r] and the standard deviation σr = Var[∆r]
1/2
are constant; the latter is also expected from market efficiency, as otherwise
it would be possible to lower one’s risk by simply investing in funds of a
different size.
In contrast, the money flux ∆f decreases with size. Both the mean
money flux µf = E[∆f ] and its standard deviation σf = Var[∆f ]
1/2 roughly
follow a power law over five orders of magnitude in the size s. This is
similar to the behavior that has been observed for the growth rates of other
types of firms [Stanley et al., 1995, 1996; Amaral et al., 1997; Bottazzi and
Secchi, 2003a]. As already discussed in footnote 9, there is a large body of
theory attempting to explain this (and we believe our own theory presented
elsewhere provides the correct explanation [Schwarzkopf et al., 2010]).
As explained in Section 2.3, the steady state solution is qualitatively
different depending on whether the parameters µ∞ and σ∞ in Eq. 24 are
positive. As can be seen from the fit parameters in Table III, based on data
for ∆s alone, we cannot strongly reject the hypothesis that the drift and
diffusion rates vanish for large sizes, i.e. µ∞ → 0 and σ∞ → 0. However,
because the size change ∆s can be decomposed as ∆s = ∆r + ∆f , efficiency
dictates that ∆r is independent of size, and since E[∆r] > 0, we are confident
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variable 1991- 1998 1991- 2005
ω0 0.14 −0.37
σω 3.02 3.16
σ0 0.35± 0.02 0.30± 0.02
β 0.31± 0.03 0.27± 0.02
σ∞ 0.05± 0.01 0.05± 0.01
R2 0.93 0.96
µ0 0.15± 0.01 0.08± 0.05
α 0.48± 0.03 0.52± 0.04
µ∞ 0.002± 0.008 0.004± 0.001
R2 0.98 0.97
Table III: Model parameters as measured from the data in different time
periods. ω0 and σ
2
ω are the mean and variance of the average (log) size of
new funds described in (4). σ0, β and σ∞ are the parameters for the size
dependent diffusion and µ0, α and µ∞ are the parameters of the average
growth rate (24). The confidence intervals are 95% under the assumption of
standard errors. The adjusted R2 is given for the fits for each period. The
time intervals were chosen to match the results shown in Fig. 5.
that neither µ∞ nor σ∞ are zero.
As we showed in Table II, the correlation between the returns ∆r and the
money flux ∆f is small. This implies that the standard deviations can be
written as a simple sum. Since ∆r is independent of size and both the mean
and standard deviation of ∆f are power laws, this indicates that Eq. 2.3 is
a good approximation, and that µ∞ and σ∞ are both greater than zero. As
illustrated in Figure 4, these functional forms fit the data reasonably well,
with only slight variations of parameters in different periods, as shown in
Table III.
5 Testing the predictions of the model
In this section we use our calibrated model of the entry, exit and size-
dependent growth processes to simulate the evolution of the firm size dis-
tribution through time. We are forced to use a simulation since, once we
include the size dependence of the diffusion and drift terms as given in
equation (24), we are unable to find an analytic solution for the general
diffusion equation (Eq. (6)). The analytic solution of the size independent
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Figure 4: An illustration that the empirical power law-based model provides
a good fit to the distribution of mutual funds. (a) The standard deviation σ
of the logarithmic size change ∆s = ∆(log s) of an equity fund as a function
of the fund size s (in millions of dollars). (b) The mean µ of ∆s = ∆(log s)
of an equity fund as a function of the fund size s (in millions of dollars).
The data for all the funds were divided into 100 equally occupied bins. µ is
the mean in each bin and σ is the square root of the variance in each bin for
the years 1991 to 2005. The data are compared to a fit according to (24) in
Figures (a) and (b) respectively.
case (Eq. (17)) gives the correct qualitative behavior, but the match is much
better once one includes the size dependence.
The simulation was done on a monthly time scale, averaging over 1000
different runs to estimate the final distribution. As we have emphasized in
the previous discussion the time scales for relaxation to the steady state
distribution are long. It is therefore necessary to take the huge increase
in the number of new funds seriously. We begin the simulation in 1991
and simulate the process for varying periods of time, making our target the
empirical distribution for fund size at the end of each period. In each case we
assume the size distribution for injecting funds is log-normal, as discussed
in Section 4.1.
To compare our predictions to the empirical data we measure the pa-
rameters for fund entry, exit and growth using data from the same period
as the simulation, summarized in Table III. A key point is that we are not
fitting these parameters on the target data for fund size18, but rather are
18 It is not our intention to claim that the processes describing fund size are constant
or even stationary. Thus, we would not necessarily expect that parameters measured on
periods outside of the sample period will be a good approximation for those in the sample
period. Rather, our purpose is to show that the random model for the entry, exit and
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Figure 5: The model is compared to the empirical distribution at different
time horizons. The left column compares CDFs from the simulation (full
line) to the empirical data (dashed line). The right column is a QQ-plot
comparing the two distributions. In each case the simulation begins in 1991
and is based on the parameters in Table III. The first row corresponds to
the years 1991-1998 and the second row to the years 1991-2005 (in each case
we use the data at the end of the quoted year).
fitting them on the individual entry, exit and diffusion processes and then
simulating the corresponding model to predict fund size. One of our main
predictions is that the time dependence of the solution is important. In
Figure 5 we compare the predictions of the simulation to the empirical data
at two different ending times. The model fits quite well at all time horizons,
though the fit in the tail is somewhat less good at the longest time horizon.
Note, that our simulations make it clear that the fluctuations in the tail are
substantial. The deviations between the prediction and the data are thus
very likely due to chance – many of the individual runs of the simulation
deviate from the mean of the 1000 simulations more than the empirical data
does.
growth processes can explain the distribution of fund sizes.
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6 Conclusions
We have argued that the mutual fund size distribution is driven by market
efficiency, which gives rise to a random growth process. The essential ele-
ments of the growth process are multiplicative random changes in the size
of existing funds, entry of new funds, and exit of existing funds as they
go out of business. We find, however, that entry plays no role at all other
than setting the scale; exit plays a small role in thickening the tails of the
distribution, but this acts only on a very slow timescale. The log-normality
comes about because the industry is young and still in a transient state, and
the exit process has not had a sufficient time to act. In the future, if the
conditions for fund growth and exit were to remain stationary for more than
a century, the distribution would become a power law. The thickening of the
tails happens from the body of the distribution outward, as the power law
tail extends to successively larger funds. We suspect that the conditions are
highly unlikely to remain this stationary, and that the fund size distribution
will remain indefinitely in its current log-normal, out of equilibrium state.
There is also an interesting size dependence in the growth rate of mutual
fund size, which is both like and unlike that of other types of firms. Mutual
funds are distinctive in that their overall growth rates can be decomposed
as a sum of two terms, ∆s = ∆f + ∆r, where ∆f represents the flow of
money in and out of funds, and ∆r the returns on money that is already
in the fund. The money flow ∆f decreases as a power law as a function of
size, similar to what is widely observed in the overall growth rates for other
types of firms. Furthermore the exponents are similar to those observed
elsewhere. The returns ∆r, in contrast, are essentially independent of fund
size, as they must be under market efficiency. As a result, for large sizes the
mean and variance of the overall growth are constant – this is unlike other
firms, for which the mean and variance appear to go to zero in the limit. As
we discuss here, this makes a difference in the long-term evolution: While
the exit process is driving mutual funds to evolve toward a heavier-tailed
distribution, other firms are evolving toward a thinner-tailed distribution.
Again, though, due to the extremely slow relaxation times, we suspect this
makes little or no difference.
Our analysis here suggests that the details of investor preference have a
negligible influence on the upper tail of the mutual fund size distribution,
except insofar as investors choose funds so as to enforce market efficiency.
Investor preference enters our analysis only through ∆f , the flow of money
in and out of the fund. Since ∆f becomes relatively small in the large
size limit, the growth of large funds is dominated by the returns ∆r, whose
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mean and variance are constant. Thus the upper tail of the size distribution
is determined by market efficiency, which dictates both that returns are
essentially random, and thus diffusive, and that there is no dependence on
size. As a result, for large fund size investor preference doesn’t have much
influence on the growth process. This is reinforced by the fact that the
statistical properties of the money flux ∆f are essentially like those of the
growth of other firms.
How can size-dependent transaction costs be compatible with our results
here? We have performed an empirical study, which we will report elsewhere,
that demonstrates that as size increases fund managers maintain constant
after-transaction cost performance by lowering fees, reducing trading and
diversifying investments. This is in contrast to the theory proposed by
Berk and Green (2004) that fund size is determined by the skill of fund
managers, i.e. that better managers attract more investment until increased
transaction cost causes excess returns to disappear. Both our theory and
that of Berk and Green are based on market efficiency. The key difference is
that we find that the flatness of performance vs. size is enforced by simple
actions taken by fund managers that do not influence the diffusion of fund
size. In contrast, the Berk and Green theory requires choices by investors
that directly influence fund size, and thus is not compatible with the free
diffusion that we have prevented empirical evidence for here. In their theory
transaction costs and investor skill determine fund size; in our theory, neither
plays a role.
We would like to stress that, while we are fitting econometric models to
the entry, exit and growth processes, and calibrating these models against
the data, we are not fitting any parameters on the size data itself. This
makes it challenging to get a model that fits as well as the model shown
in Fig. 5. Of course, we have only demonstrated that the random process
model is sufficient to explain fund size; we cannot demonstrate that other
explanations might not also be able to explain it. However, the assumptions
that we make here are simple and natural. The stochastic nature of fund
growth is not surprising: It is well known that past returns do not pre-
dict future returns. Thus even if investors chase returns, they are chasing
something that is inherently random. We believe that this is at the core of
why our model works so well. Our demonstration that a good explanation
can be obtained based on market efficiency alone, which requires weaker as-
sumptions than full rationality, provides a theory that is robust and largely
independent of the details of human choice.
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A Inadequacy of Gini coefficients to characterize
tail behavior
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Figure 6: The Gini coefficients as described in equation (26) are calculated
numerically for a lognormal distribution and a Pareto distribution. The Gini
Coefficients were calculated for different parameter values and are plotted as
a function of the resulting standard deviation. For the Pareto distribution
(footnote 20) we used s0 = 0.01 and different exponents α in the range
(2, 5], i.e. a finite second moment. The lower standard deviation σ = 0.0033
corresponds to α = 5 and σ = 1916.17 corresponds to α → 2. For the
lognormal we used a = 0 and different b in the range [0.1, 2.8] where b = 0.1
corresponds to σ = 0.101 and b = 2.757 corresponds to σ = 2000.
The Gini coefficient [Gini, 1912] is commonly used as a measure of in-
equality but as we show here it is not suitable for distinguishing between
highly skewed distributions when one wishes to focus on tail behavior. For
a non negative size s with a CDF F (s), the Gini coefficient G is given by
G =
1
E[s]
∫ ∞
0
F (s)(1− F (s))ds, (26)
where E[s] is the mean [Dorfman, 1979]. To illustrate the problem we com-
pare the Gini coefficients of a Pareto distribution to those of a lognormal19.
For a Pareto distribution with tail parameter α the m > α moments do
not exist. This is in contrast to the lognormal distribution, for which all
19 The CDF of the Pareto distribution is defined as
Fp(s) = 1−
(
s
s0
)−α
, (27)
where s0 is the minimum size and α is the tail exponent. The CDF of a lognormal is given
27
moments exist. Naively one would therefore expect that the Gini coeffi-
cient of the Pareto distribution (see footnote 18) to be larger than that of
a lognormal since it has a heavier upper tail. This is true for a Pareto dis-
tribution with α < 2, for which the Gini coefficient is one due to the fact
that the standard deviation does not exist. However, when α < 2, for large
standard deviations the Gini coefficient of the log-normal is greater than
that of the Pareto, as shown in Figure 6. In order to compare apples to
apples in Figure 6 we plot the Gini coefficient as a function of the standard
deviation (which is a function of the distribution parameters). For a Pareto
distribution with a finite second moment (α > 2) the lognormal has a higher
coefficient.
Thus, even though the Gini coefficient is frequently used as measure for
inequality, it is not a good measure when one seeks to study tail proper-
ties, particularly for comparisons of distributions with different functional
representations. The reason is that the Gini coefficient is a property of the
whole distribution, and depends on the shape of the body as well as the tail.
Similar remarks apply to the Herfindahl index.
B Simulation model
We simulate a model with three independent stochastic processes. These
processes are modeled as Poisson process and as such are modeled as having
at each time step a probability for an event to occur. The simulation uses
asynchronous updating to mimic continuous time. At each simulation time
step we perform one of three events with an appropriate probability. These
probabilities will determine the rates in which that process occurs. The
probability ratio between any pair of events should be equal to the ratio of
the rates of the corresponding processes. Thus, if we want to simulate this
model for given rates our probabilities are determined.
These processes we simulate are:
1. The rate of size change taken to be 1 for each fund and N for the
entire population.
Thus, each fund changes size with a rate taken to be unity.
2. The fund exit rate λ which can depend on the fund size.
by
Fln(s) =
1
2
(
1 + Erf
[
log(s)− a√
2b
])
, (28)
where a is a location parameter and b is the scale parameter.
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3. The rate of creation of new funds ν.
Each new fund enters with a size ω with a probability density f(ω).
Since some of these processes are defined per firm as opposed to the
creation process, the simulation is not straightforward. We offer a brief
description of our simulation procedure.
1. At every simulation time step, with a probability ν1+λ+ν a new fund
enters and we proceed to the next simulation time step.
2. If a fund did not enter then the following is repeated (1 + λ)N times.
a. We pick a fund at random.
b . With a probability of λ1+λ the fund enters.
c. If it is not annihilated, which happens with a probability of 11+λ ,
we change the fund size.
We are interested in comparing the simulations to both numerical and
empirical results. The comparisons with analytical results are done for spe-
cific times and for specific years when comparing to empirical data. In order
to do so, we need to convert simulation time to ”real” time. The simulation
time can be compared to ’real’ time if every time a fund does not enter
we add a time step. Because of the way we defined the probabilities each
simulation time step is comparable to 1/(1 + λ) in ”real” time units. The
resulting ”real” time is then measured in what ever units our rates were
measured in. In our simulation we use monthly rates and as such a unit
time step corresponds to one month.
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